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ISSUES PRESENTED
As framed by the United States District Court, the issues
are as follows:

(1)

Under the Utah Comparative Fault Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-38, [sic] et. seq., can a Jury
apportion
the
fault
of
the
plaintiff's
employers that caused or contributed to the
accident although said employers are lmmune
from suit under Utah Worker's Compensation Act,
Utah Code Ann. q 35-1-60 et. seq.

(2)

Under the utah Comparative Fault Act, Utah Code
Ann. q 78-27-38,
~sic~
et. seq., can a Jury
apportion the fault of an individual or entity
that has been dismissed from the litigation but
against whom it is claimed that they have
caused or contributed to the accident.
12],:TERI1J NAT IVE~STATUTF.S
The trial court has requested this Court to interpret the

Utah

Comparative

Additionally,
35-1-62

Fault

the

Act,

Utah

provlslons

are determinative.

Code Ann.

of

Utah

Code

(Sullivan has

§§

78-27-37

Ann.

qq

reproduced

et.

seq.

35-1-60

the

and

text of

these statutes in Appendix A to this brief)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Trackmobile erroneously equates "fault" to any act proxl~ately

defined

causlng
"fault"

omission."
employee

lnJury.
as

an

Since the

against

an

HOl,..;ever

"actionable

I

the

legislature

breach

of

legal

specifically
duty,

act,

or

legislature has abrogated any action by an

enployer,

an

employer
Hence,

under the Comparative Fault Act.

be

at

"fault"

the jury may not consider

the enployers' acts ',.;hen allocating "fault."

1

cannot

since
and

"fault"

makes

no

Sullivan's

there

1S

difference

employers

nothing
whether

are

for the
the

by

definition

jury to compare,

employers

can

be

Trackmobile's

efforts

to

so

classify

unavailing.

The employers cannot be

not

because

"1 iable

recovery,"

of

SInce Ranger

faul t. "

classified

as

Nonethe-

employers

are

"defendants," since they are

They

are

Insurance Company

under worker's compensation law)

the

at

it really

"defendants" or "persons seeking recovery" under the act.
less,

not

not

"persons

seeking

(the subrogated CClrrler

is the trustee of Sullivan's CCluse

of actIon.
This Court's
intent,

function

.is to determine the

not to second guess the legislature's wisdom.

legislClture's
It makes no

difference whether comparative causation may be consistent with the
Worker's Compensation Act,
other

jurisdictions.

feaSIble.

ur in accord with decisions of

The legislature's

formulation

1S determinCl-

tive.
The
Trackmobile

legislation

has

failed

is

presumptively

to carry

statute's unconstitutionality.

its

burden

constitutional,

and

of demonstrating

the

The statute is not unconstitutional

merely because it cured some, but not all, of the ills perceived in
the previous comparative system.
As
statute

is

a

final

matter,

unconst i tutiona 1,

if

the

Court

Trackmobile

several liabilIty under prior law.

2

is

determ i nes
sub j eet

to

that

the

j oint

and

ARGUMENT
I.
A.

THE JURY MCST APPORTION DAMAGES ON THE BASIS OF
"FAULT" RATHER THAN CAUSATION.

Trackmobile Ignores the Legislature's Definition of "Fault."
Trackmobile

conduct

of

insists

Sull ivan's

employers

apportionment of "fault."
word

"fault"

ln

its

jury

must

consider

order

to

arr 1 ve

at a

the

correct

argument,

it

never expressly

states what

it

Its arguments amply demonstrate, how-

that it considers "fault" to include all conduct proximately

causlng

injury.

damages,

~

While

this

may

be

one

method

for

apportioning

it is not the method chosen by the Utah legislature.
The

Ann.

in

the

Although Trackmobile frequently uses the

means when it uses the term.
ever,

that

legislature

78 - 27 - 37 (2)

expressly

defined

"fault"

in

utah

Code

(1 9 92) :

"Fault" means any actionable breach of legal
duty, act, or omission proximately causlng or
contributing to injury or damages sustained by
a person seeking recovery, including, but not
limited to,
negligence ln all its degrees,
contributory negligence, assumption of risk,
strict liability, breach of express or implied
warranty of a product, products liability, and
misuse, modification or abuse of a product.
[Emphasis added.:
Trackmobile apparently contends that the vwrd "actionable" modifies
only the term "breach of legal duty" and that "fault" additionally
includes iiIlL act or orcission proximately causing injury.
such

a

reading

impos i t ion

of

of

the

abso 1 ute

statute

leads

1 iab iii ty

on

to

a

startling

"de f endants"

HOh'ever!

result--the

whose

would have never been actionable under prior Utah law.

conduct

Of course,

there is simply no evidence that the Utah Legislature intended such
a revolutionary result.
3

This Court has always held that a statute "will be gIven
a

reasonable and sensib Ie construct ion. "

tronics,

Inc.,

P.2d 1044,

575

curtis v.

(Utah 1978).

1046

Harmon Elec-

The onl y reason-

able construction that can be given to the Comparative Fault Act is
that

the

Jury

is

to

apportion

damages

only

among

those

parties

whose breaches of legal duty, acts, or omissions <lre i'L<::lciol}a.ble.
B.

Neith"'-LJO.1l1li"/.,,n'.? Employers Nor Denver and Rio Grande Western

Ra iJr:oad bre _il_t__ " F CD} tt_~_~~

!iull iVqn' s .. employers--conduct
HQL_Clct.iol}_able.

1.

Sullivan's employers are at "fault"
ted

an

"act ionable"

breach

of

proximately caused injury.

legal

duty,

only if they commit-

act

or omISSIon which

There was no actionable breach of leg<ll

duty, act, or omission here.
Utah Code Ann.

§

]5-1-60

(1988).

to which Trackmobile has

referred, states in relevant part:
The right to recover compensation pursuant to
the provisions of this title
tor Injurles
sustained by an employee
shall be In
place of ar'y and all other CiVIL liability
Whatsoever, at common law or otherwise.
Except

for

enployee's

intentional

comnon

leiW

torts,

right

this

statute

to sue the

employer

abrogates
for

any and <lll

injuries suffered while in the course of his employment."
v.

United states !3.nelting Refining

616,

(Utah

111

Ut.

1975)

101

(1948);

Mining Company,

191

1l1:yanv. Utah Tnternatior.lal,

Although

employers were negligent,

&

Trackmobile
the conduct

4

insists

"the

that

Masich

P.2d 612,

531 P.2d 892
Sullivan's

IS not actionable under the

Worker's

Compensation

and

Act,

the

Jury

cannot

consider

the

employers' conduct in the apportionment process.
2.

Denver and Rio Grande Western
Railroad--no breach of legal duty.

The trial

court

has entered summary

judgment dismissing

Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad from this action,
a

matter

stances

of

law

of

that

this

it

case.

Denver and Rio Grande
omission
that

was

there

a

owed
Even

no

duty to Sullivan

though

acted or

proximate

was

no

failed

cause

actionable

Trackmobile

of

in the circum-

Clay

contend

that

to act and that the act or

Sullivan's

breach

holding as

of

legal

injuries,
duty

the

fact

precludes

the

omiSSion

of

attribution of "fault" to the railroad.
Result not joint and several
liability.

J.

Trackmobile
Sullivan's
several
If

the

liability.
acts

defendants
that

employers

or

will

"fault."

when

errs

fro",

the

verdict

Trackmobile

omiSSions
pay

of

daClages

Sullivan

aClount of his damages

asserts

it

form

results

in

joint

and

is but one of several defendants.

all

constitute

based

on

its

not

be

able

'..;ill

that

"fault,"

each

proportionate
to

collect

of

share

the

the
of

entire

from anyone of these defendants unless the

jury finds only one defendant at "fault."
C.
Sullivan's Employers Are Neither
Seeking Recovery" Under the Act.
Since

by

definition

"Defendants"

Sullivan's

employers

Nor

"Persons

cannot

be

at

"fault," it is irrelevant '.,hether they are "defendants" or "persons

5

seeking recovery."

Nevertheless,

Trackmobile

in error when

1S

it

argues that the employers fall in either category.

1.
Trackmobile

"defendant,,",-~

Not

maintains

that

Sullivan's

employers

IIdefendants," because they are not l1immune from suit."

ing i'lxguendo

that Trackmobile

is correct,

are

Even assum-

the employers are st i 11

not "defenddnts.1I

utah
"defendant"

Code

Ann.

78-27-37(1)

~

(1992)

defines

the

ten"

as follows:

"Defendant" means any person not Immune from
suit who 1S claimed to be liable_iJgcau.:?_e of
fault to any person seeking recovery.
[Emphasis added.]

The

definition

"immune
liable

from

has

suit,1I

"because

Sullivan
liability

1S

of

the

elements.
c("jnnot

they

fault.11

payment

an ses

the employers'

two

solely

of

Even

employers'

Worker's

from

the

the

employers

"defendants"

be

The

if

they

only

Compensation

employment

if

are

not

are

not

liability

benefits,

to

which

relationship.

since

liability is not based on "fault," the employer,; are

not "defendants."

Trackmobile
"persons

seeking

basis in fact.

asserts

recovery 11

that

under

the

Sullivan's
act.

This

employers
argument

has

are

no

\'Ihile it is true that an employer may l;Jg a trustee

of the employee's cause of action against third parties under Iltah
Code

Ann.

~

35-1-62

(1988),

whether

6

the

employer

1_"

actually

the

trustee

depends

on

the

The

circumstances.

statute

provides

In

relevant part:
If compensation is claimed and the employer or
insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay
compensation, the employer or insurance carrier
shall become trustee of the cause of action
against the third party and may bring and
maintain the action either in its own name or
In the name of the injured employee
[Emphasis added.]
Under

the

statute,

the

ent i ty who

pays

the

benef its becomes the

trustee of the cause of action.

Mr. Sullivan testified in his deposition that he received
"o'iorker's

compensation

(Sullivan
Ranger
(Ranger
persons

Depo.

pp.

Insurance
Insurance
seeking

bene fits

Appendix

185-187,

Company

through

had

Coropany

paid

Ranger
As

B)

over

here

are

of

in

Kenneth

1990,

benefits.

Hence,

C)

COr:1pany.

Decerober

$275,000

letter--Appendix

recovery

Insurance

the

Sullivan

and

only
the

insurance company.
II.

TRACKMOBILE INVITES THIS COURT TO IMPLEMENT A
COMPARATIVE CACSATION SCHEME UNDER THE GUISE
OF INTERPRETING THE COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT.
Trackmobile

has

designed

its

arguments

to

persuade

the

Court that comparative causation is superior to comparative fault.
First,
the

it discusses the coropatibility of comparative causation with

purposes

Second,

it

and

cites

Negligence Act,

language
Ctah

cases

~stensibly

of

the

Worker's

interpreting

the

Compensation
197]

Comparative

illustrating feasibility of the concept

and highlighting the Court's prior concerns about fairness.
Tracknobile

inplicitly

Act.

refers

to

cases

froC)

other

implicitly arguing that "everybody else is doing it."
7

Third,

jurisdictions,
However, the

issue

1S

not

causation

whether

system

Court's duty

or

is to

it

is

possible

whether

such

to

a

implement

system

lS

effectuate the system the

a

comparative

desirable.

This

legislature chose to

enact.
A.
The Utoh Cases Interpret Facets of the
Negligence Act.
Trackmobile
Corp~.,

jury

690
had

P.2d 541

cites

the

Court

(Utah 1984)

apportioned

among

Presumabl y,

plaintiff's

employer.

for

the proposition that a

Utah comparative

Godesky

v.

Provo

(ity

and this Court's comment that

negl igence

the

to

1973

ent i ties

varlOUS

Trackmobile

C 1

the

including

t es the

case

jury is copilble of apportionlng responlIowever,

sibility based on causatiorl.

feasib iIi ty is not. the

issue

here.
Trackmob1le
Bishgp v.

Niele;.en,

City School

64"

among

Comparative

P.2d 658

Court's

(Utah 1982),
The

relevance to the

Negligence

the

attention

(Utah 1')81) and Madsen v.

tort-feasors.

those cases have no
Utah

directs

632 P.2d 864

B<;>ord,

contribution

further

Act,

Salt LaX"

both cases addressing

considerations
issues here.

each

to

defendant

expressed

In

Under the 1973
was

jointly

and

severally liable to the plaintiff and wos entitled to contribution
from

other

78-27-41

joint

(1973

!-ladsen 'were
tiffs,

the

tort-feasors.

Supp.)

Since

jointly and

Utah

the

severally

Code

tort-feasors
liable

However,

considerations

of

'i~

78-27-39

1n both

to the

focus of the Court's attentiun was

t.ort-feasors.

Ann.

and

Bishop and

respective plain-

fairness among Joint
fairness

under

the

Comparative Fault Act relate to the allocations of risk between the
injured plaintiff and "defendants" at "fault"
8

for the injury.

------------- -

--------_.

Passage
significant
Under the

of

risks

the

from

the

Utah

Comparative

tort-feasor

to

Comparative Negligence Act,

1973

of the plaintiffs'

Fault

the

Act

injured

shifted

plaintiff.

a tort-feasor paid all

damages without being able to recoup the share

of damages attributable to an impecunious joint tort-feasor or the
plaintiff's
Supp.),

employers.

See

Utah

Code

curtis Harmon Electronics.

and Phillips v.
Now

1980) .

Inc.,

~

a

"defendant"

lS

78-27-41(1)

552 P.2d 117

Union.Pacific Railroad Company,

because

I

Ann.

61~

( 1973

(Ctah 1976),

P.2d 153

responsible

to

(Utah

pay damages

based only on it.s share of "fault," the injured plaintiff bears the
risk

of

not

impecunious.

obtaining
However,
not

full

recovery

contrary

legislature

did

shift

plaintiff.

"Defendants"

to

all

roay

from

to

the

burdens

still

pay

some

lIdefendant'sll

a

Trackmobile' s

of

proxiroately caused by parties who,
immune

due

assertions,

and

rlsks

damages

for

to

the

1nJur1es

by virtue of public policy,

suitor whose acts do not constitute

the

"fault."

are

While

Trackmobile undoubtedly believes that the legislature's allocation
of

risk

1S

unfair,

the

allocation

provides

Trackmobile

and

other

"defendants" significant benefits not provided by prior la·..;.
B.
Decisions Interpreting Other States' Statutes
On Ctah's Comparative Fault Systero.

Have~Q.e_aring

Trackmobile cites numerous cases from other jurisdictions
interpreting

their

acknm-lledges that,
the

other

:::obile's

respective
"the

j urisd ictions
Brief,

p.

19)

statutes.

~anguage

1S not

of the

Trackroobile

comparative

ident ica 1 to Ctah' s

These

decisions

candidly

fault acts in
Act."

interpreting

(Track-

unique

statutes have no bearing on the interpretation of Ctah's statute.
9

In Jensen
(Utah

903

1984),

"unit rule"

v.

this

Intermountain
Court

Health Care,

addressed

the

Inc.,

679

applicability

to the 197J Utah Comparative Negligence Act.

P.2d

of

the

The Court

noted that at least one section of the act was identIcal to and had
been borrowed from the State of Wisconsin.

Nonetheless,

the Court

refused to adopt Wisconsin'S interpretation stating:
The best evidence of the true
intent and
purpose of the Legislature in enacting the Act
is the plain language of the Act.
cL",nsen,
slons

679
of

Utah's

P.2d at 906.

other

If the Court

jurisdictions

statutes,

it

is not bound by the deci-

interpreting

is obv lously

not

statutes

identical

to

bound by decisions of state

courts interpreting dissimilar statutes.

The best evidence of the

true intent of the Utah Legislature is the "plain language or the
act" itself.
III.

TRACKMOBTLE'S CLAIM OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY IS
FRIVOLOUS.

A.
:rhEe Court Need ._Not Cons ider Arguments. .Jvh ich. Ild\T£...Been InadeguatelY Briefed.
This Court has previously observed that "all statutes are
presumed to be constitutional and the party challenging a statute
bears the burden of proving its invalidity."
Shield v.

State,

779

P.2d 634,

637

(Utah 1989).

Trackmobile has

utterly failed to carry its burden.
In two brief paragraphs and without citation to any case
Trackmobile

asserts

that

the

Utah

Comparative

Fault

Act

violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article

I,

Section 2·. of the Utah Constitution.
10

In an addi-

tional

two

Trackmobile

brief

paragraphs

claims

that

the

with
ctah

citation

to

Comparative

only

Fault

one

Act

case,

violates

Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution.
The
spaced
does

entire

pages,

does

constitutional
not

articulate

discussion
the

covers

appl icable

two

standards,

not make an attempt to analyze the constitutional

terms of the standards.

In similar circumstances,

double
and

1ssues 1n

the Ctah Court

of Appeals refused to even consider the parties' contention:
Appellants' brief contains less than a single
page of assertions on this point and no citations to the record, no legal authorities and
no analysis whatsoever.
Their brief is not in
compliance '..;i th our rules which requ1re the
brief of the appellant to contain an argument.
"The argument shall contain the contentions and
reasons of the appellant with respect to the
issues presented with citations to the authorities, statutes and part of the record relied
on." Ctah R.App.P. 24(a)(9).
Thus, '..;e decline
to address th is issue and assune the correctness
of
the
judgnent belo'..;.
[Citations
omi tted. 1
Christensen

v.

Trackmobile

has

Munns,
not

812

P.2d

presented

69,
an

72

(Utah App.

argument,

the

1991)
Court

since
need

not

address this issue.
B.
A Statute Is Not Unconstitutional Merely Because It Does Not
Rectify All Perceived Ills.
As

discussed

1n

Peint

II,

the

Comparative

shifted some but not all risks to the plaintiff.

Fault

Act

However, the utah

Comparative Fault Act is not unconstitutional by mere virtue of the
fact that the legislature did not address all inequities perceived
by

Trackmobile

1n

the

1973

legislation.

stated:
11

This

Court

recently

In determining constitutionality,

courts are

guided by the familiar principles that a
"statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone further
than it did," that a legislature need not
"strike dt all evils at the same time,"
and that "reform may take one step at a
time, addressing itself to the phase of
the problem which seems most acute to the
legislative mind."
[Citations omitted.]
§.reenwood

v.

City

of

North

Salt

Lakg,

817

P.2d

816,

821

(Utah

1991) .

IV.

I F THE UTAH COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT IS
UNCONSTITUTIClNAL, TRACKMOBILE AND THE
REMAINDER OF THE DEFENDANTS IN THIS ACTION
ARE SUBJECT TO JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY.
The

Utah

Comparative

Fault

Utah ComparaUve Negligence Act
~

of

78-27-41 (1)

(1973

joint and

Faul t

A.ct

Supp.)

several

1S

liability.

262,

50 Ut.

P.

1019,

189

48

(1917),

repealed

the

including Utah Code Ann.

If,
the

indeed,
repealer

the Utah Comparative
1S

its co-defendants are subject to

liability under pr10r law.
159

1973,

expressly

·.... hich preserved the common law doctrine

unconsti tutional,

Trackmobile and

Hunter,

of

Act

ineffective,

and

joint and several

See Board of Education of Ogden City v.
ut.

373

(1916),

and In re J.P.,

i?tilJ:~ .. v,.

Barker,

648 P.2d 1364,

167

P.

1378 fn.

14

(Utah 1982).

CONCLUSION
The
Al though
being

Utah

Comparative

Trilckmobile

nothing

more

would

thiln

a

Fault

have

the

comparative

Act.

1S

Court

premised
interpret

causation

on

"fault."

the

scheme,

act

the

as

Utah

Legislature's express ldnguage repudiates such a contention and the

12

Court is bound to enforce the statute as written.

Tracknobile has

failed

the Conparative

Fault

to carry
Act

is

its burden of demonstrating that

unconstitutional.

unconstitutional,

However,

if

the

legislation

lS

Trackmobile and its co-defendants are subject to

joint and several liability.
DATED this

day of May, 1992.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL,

P.C.

By
L. Rich Humpherys
M. Douglas Bayly
Attorneys for Kenneth Sullivan
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APPENDIX A

Utah Comparative Fault Act
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 et. seq.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-60 and 35-1-62

)
))

JUDICIAL CODE

78-27 -35

78-27-35_

Release, settlement, or statement by injured p erson - Notice of rescission or disavowaL

Notice of cancellation or notice disavowing a statement. if given by mail. is
given when it is deposited in a mailbox , properly addressed with postage
prepaid . Notice of cancella tion given by the injured person need not take a
particu lar form and is sufficien t if it indicates by a ny form of written expression t he intention of t he injured perso n not to be bound by the settlement
agree ment, liability release, or disavowed statement.
History, L. 1973. ch. 208, § 4.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

,

,

Am . JUT. 2d. - 66 Am. Jur. 2d Release § 14
et seq .

C.J.S. -

76 C.J.S. Release § 38 et seq.

78·27·36.

Right of rescission or disavowal of release, set·
tlement, or statement by injured person in addi·
tion to other provisions.

The rights provided by this act are intended to be in addition to. and not in
lieu of, any rights of rescission, rules of evidence, or provisions otherwise
existing in the law.
History: L. 1973. ch. 208. § 5.
Meaning o f " this act," - See note following same catchline ' in notes to § 78·27·32.

78·27·37.

,

Definitions.

As used in Sections 78-27-37 t hrough 78-27-43:
(1) uDefendant" means any person not immune fro m suit who is
claimed to be liable because of fault to a ny person seeking recove r y.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach oflegal duty, act, or om ission
proxima tely causing or contributin g to injury or damages sustained by a
perso n seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, negligence in . all
its degrees, contributory negligence, ass umption of ri sk . strict liability,
breach of expr ess or implied warra nty of a product, products liabil ity , and
misuse, modification or abuse of a product.
(3) "P erson seek ing recovery" means any person seeking damages or
reimbursement on its own beha lf, or on behalf of another for whom it is
a uthorized to act as legal representa ti ve.
His tory: C. 1953. 78-27-37, e nacted by L.
1986. ch. \ 99, ! t.
Repeals and R een actm ents. - Laws 1986 ,
ch. 1989, § 1 repea ls form er 9 78-27-37, as en·

acted by Laws 1973. ch . 209, § 1. relating t '
dimini shment of dama ges and assumption of
ri sk, and reenacts the abo ve section.

430

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

78-27 -3 8

:.i

•

NOTES TO DECISIONS

.~

".,-,

Cited in Deats v. Commercial Sec. Bank.
746 P.2d 1191 (Uta h Ct. App. 1987).

\!

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

"
Journal of Contemporary Law. - For
comment, "The Liability Reform Act: An Approach to Equitable Application, " see 13 J .
Co n temp. L. 89 (1987 ).

78-27-38.

n

A.L.R . - Liability to one struck by golf ball .
53 A.L.R.4th 282.

";1
~

~'I

Comparative negligence.

The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery by that
person. He may recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose
fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is liable to any person seeking
recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to
that defendant.
Hi s tory: C. 1953, 78·27·38. enacted by L.
1986. ch. 199. § 2.
Repeals and Reenactme nts. - Laws 1986,
ch. 199, § 2 repeals fo rmer § 78-27-38. as enacted by Laws 1973. ch. 209. § 2, relating to
special verdicts. and reenacts the above section .

C ross-References. - Product Liability Act,
man ufact urer or seller not liable if alterat ion
or modification of product after sale is substantial contributing cause of injury. ~ 78-15-5 .
Skiers not to make claim against or recover
from ski area oper ator fo r injury resul t in g from
any inhe re nt risk of skiing, § 78 -27-53.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

~

j
,j

.,

.,

. J

:'1
~

ANALYSTS

Assumption of risk .
Bailment.
Ca usation.
Dramshops.
Jury instructions.
Last clear chance.
Open and obvi ous danger.
Uni t method of determining negligence,
Wrongful death.
Cit.ed,

;.

Assumption of risk.
"Assumption of r isk," Le_, ris k of a known
danger voluntarily assumed . may amount to a
lack of due care const.ituting negligence; where
such is the case and the party assuming the
risk is the plaintiff in an act.ion governed by
compara tive negligence statute. he is chargeable with contributory negligence and is liable
to have his recovery reduced or denied in accordance with its provisions. Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Ass'n. 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah
1977), overruled on other grounds. Moore v.
Burton Lumber & Hdwe. Co., 631 P.2d 865
(Uta h 1981).
Assumption of risk language is not appropriate to describe the various concepts pre viously

dealt with under that terminology but is to be
treated. in its secondary sense, as cont r ibutory
negligence; when the issue is rai sed anention
s hou ld be focu sed on whether a reasonably prudent man in the exercise of due care would
have incurred the risk, despite hi s knowledge
of it. and if so. whether he would have conducted himself in the manner in which the person seek in g to r ecover acted in light of all the
surroundmg circumstances. Including the appreciated risk ; then. if the unreaso nableness of
the person seeking to recover is viewed to be
less than that of the person from whom recovery is sought, any damages allowed should be
diminished in proportion to the amount of negli gence attributable to the person recove r ing .
Jacobsen Co nstr. Co. v. StruclO- Lite E ng'g,
Inc.. 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980l.
As used in § 78-27-37, "assumption of risk"
is a voluntary and unreasonable exposure to a
known danger. Moo re v, Burton Lumber &
Hdwe. Co .. 631 P.2d 865 {Utah 1981 l.
Assumption of ri sk language is not appropriate in an instruction under comparative negligence statutes. Stephe ns v. Henderson . 7-11
P .2d 952 (Utah 1987) tapplying s tatute in effect pr ior to 1986).
The assumption of ri sk doctrine has bee n ex-
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;!lSCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Application of comparative negli gence doctrine, generally. 86 A.L.R.3d 1206,
Comparative negligenc~ doctrine applied to
actio ns based on strict liability in tort. 9
A.L.R.4lh 633.
Effect of adoption of comparative negligence
rul es on assumption of ris k and co ntribu tory
negligence. 16 A.L.R.4th 700.
Commercia l rente r's negli ge nce liability for
customer 's personal inj uries. 57 A. L.R.4th
11 86.
Liability to one struck by golf club, 63
A.L.R.4lh 221.
Liability for injury incurred in operation of
power golf cart. 66 A.L.R.4lh 622.
'fort liabili ty for window wa sher's inj ury or
death. 69 A.L.R.4th 207 .
Compa r a tive fault: calculati on of net recov ·
ery by applying percentage of plaintifTs fault
before or after subtracting amount of se ttlement by less than all joint tortfeasors, 71
A.L.R,4lh 1108.
Rescue doctrine: applicability and applica ·
tion of comparative negligence principles. 75
A.L.R,4lh 875.
Key Numbers. - Negligence G=> 97 et seq.

Brigham Young , Law Review. - The
Merger of ~.om~a ratlve Fault P.rincipies with
Strict Liability In Utah: Mulherin v. Ingersoll!/snd Co .. 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev . 964. 966.
. Dama ge Apportionment in Accounting Mal·
practice Actions: The Role of Compara tive
Faull, 1990 B.Y.U.L. Rev . 949.
Journal of Contemporary Law. - For
comment. "The Liability Reform Act: An Approach to Equitable Application." 13 J .
Contemp. L. 89 (1987),
Am. Jur. 2d. - 578 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence
§ 1128 et seq.
C.J.S. - 65A C.J.S. Negligence ~ 169 et
seq.

A.L.R. Comparative negligence rule
where misco nduct of three or more persons is
involved. 8 A.L.R.3d 722.
Retrospective applicati on of state statute
substitutin g rule of comparative negligence for
that of contributory negli ge nce. 37 A.L.R.3d
1438.
Indemnity or contribution between joint tortieasors on basis of relative fau lt. 53 A. L.R3d
184.
Mode m development of comparative negligence doctrine having applicabili ty to negliJ;ence actions generally, 78 A.L.R.3d 339.

78-27-39.

78-27 -39

Separate special verdicts on total damages and
proportion of fault.

The trial court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury,
if any, to find separate special verdicts determining the total amount of damages sustained and the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each
person seeking recovery and to each defendant.
History: C. 1953, 78-27·39. e nacted by L.
1986. ch. 199. § 3.
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1986.
ch. 199. ~ 3 repeals former § 78-27-39 , as en-

acted by Laws 1973. ch. 209. ~ 3, relating to
contribution among joint tortieasors. a nd r een ·
acts the above section.

NOTES TO DE CISIONS

I,
,I

to the plaintiff 50% or more of the neglige nce it
finds in a comparati ve neglige nce case. if the
effect of such an instruction will not be to con fuse or mislead the j ury. Dixon v. Stewart. 658
P.2d 591 (Utah 1982).

ANALYSIS

Jury instructions.
Cited.

Jury instructions.
If requested. a trial court must inform the
jury of the legal consequences of apportioning

I .

Cited in Reeves v. Genti le, 8 13 P.2d 111
(Utah 1991).
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78-27 -40

-;

78-27-40.

,

I,
•

,t
I

.JUDICIAL CODE

Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault
- No contribution.

Subject to Section 78,27,38, t he maximum amount for which a defendant
may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion
of the damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed
to that defendant. No defendant is entitled to contribution from any other
person.
Cross-References. - Enforcement of con ·
tribution and rei mburseme nt, Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 69( h L
Joint obligations. ~ 15-4-1 e t seq.

History: C. 1953, 78·27-40, enacted by L.
1986. c h. 199, § 4.
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1986 ,
ch. 199. § 4 repeals fo rmer q 78-27-40, as enacted by Laws 1973. ch. 209. ~ 4. relatin~ to
settlement by a joint tortfeasor. and ree nacts
the above section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

ployer's e mployees. Shell Oil Co.
v.
Brinke rhoff·Signal Dnlling Co., 658 P.2d 1187
(Utah 1983).

ANALYS IS

1

,,.
~

; ~

i
j

1
,,
I

,1
I!

Appli cability of section.
Indemnitv contract.
Plaintifr~ minor ch ild as joint tortfeasor.
Workers' co mpensation.
Cited .
Applicability of section.
A statute. such as this section. elim inating
joint and several liabili ty may not be applied to
inj uries occurring prior to its effective date.
Where the inj uries occurred on Novembe r 8.
1984. a nd t he Liability Reform Act was not
effect ive until April 28. 1986. the tria l court
was correct in holding that the Liability Re·
fo rm Ac t did not a pply . Stephens v. Henderson.
741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987).
Indemnity contract.
The former comparative neg lige nce prov i·
sions d id not in va lidate an employe r's indem·
nity contr act with a third party whe reby em·
playe r agreed to indem nify the t hird party
agai nst claims aris ing out of injuries to the em·

Plaintiffs minor child as jo int tonfeasor.
Wh ere plaintiff was a warded a judgme nt In
action aga ins t a defendant to recover the property loss susta ined as the res ult of a collision
betwee n a utomobi les operated by defendant
and the minor uneman cipated daughter of the
plaintiff. and where the da ughter'S negligence
co ntributed to the property loss sustained by
her fathe r. the minor daughter was a joi nt tort·
feasor and li able to lhe defenda nt fo r contribution. Bi shop v. N ielsen. 632 P.2d 864 (Utah
19811.

\

I,
I,

i,

I
I

I,
I

Workers ' compe nsation.
Em ployer ca nn Ol be a joint tonfeaso r as to
a n injury to his empl oyee covered by the Work·
men 's Compe nsatio n Act. Cu rti s v. Harmon
Elec .. Inc .. 552 P .2d 117 lUtah 19i6): Phill ips
v. Union Pac. R.R.. 6 1-1, P.2d 153 (L" tah 1980\.
Cited in Warren v. Honda Motor Co .. 669 F.
S upp. 365 iD. Utah 1987),

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Brigham Young Law Review. - Utah AI·
lows Contribution Against Cotortfeasor De·
s pite Immunity from Direct Sui t: Bishop v.
Nielse n. 1982 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 429.
Journal of Contemporary Law. - Com·
ment. The Liability Reform Act: An Approach
t r '<.: quitable Application , 13 J . Con temp. L. 89
(1987).

I

1

I
i
~

A.L.R. - Ri ght of tortfeasor initially causing inj ury to recover indemnity or contribution
from medical atte ndant aggravatin g inj ury or
t:a usin~ new inj ury in cour se of t reatme nt, 72
A.L.RAth 23l.
Prod ucts liability: se ller's ri ght to inde mn ity
from manufacturer, 79 A.L.R.4th 278.

434
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78-27-41.

78-27 -4 3

Joinder of defendants.

A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a party to the litigation ,
may join as parties any defendants who may have caused or contributed to the
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the purpose of havin g
determined their respective proportions of fault.
.

!
I

History: C. 1953.78·27·41, enacted by L.
1986 . ch. 199. ! 5.
Repeals and Reenactme nts. - Laws 1986.
ch. 199. § 5 repeals former 78-27.41. as en-

acted by Laws 1973. ch . 209. § 5, relating: to
rights of contribution and indemn ity. and reen·
acts the above section .

*

j

COLLAT ERA L REFERENCES
A.L.R. - Products liability: seiter 's right to
indemnity from manufacturer. 79 A.L.R.4th
278 .

78-27-42.

Release to one defendant does not discharge
other defendants.

A release given by a person seeki ng recovery to one or more defendants does
not discharge any other defendant unless t he release so provides.
History: C. 1953. 78-27-42, enacted by L.
1986. ch. 199. ; 6.
Repea ls and Reenactments. - Laws 1986.
eh . 199 . S 6 repeals forme r S 78·27-42, as ~n-

*

acted by Laws 1973. eh. 209, 6, relating to
release of joint tonfeasors a nd a reduction of
claim. and reenacts the above section.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

*

Am. Jur. 2d. - 66 Am . Jur. 2d Release 35
et seq.
C.J.S. - i6 C.J.S . Release § 38 eL seq .
A.L.R. - Tortfeasor's general release of co·
tort feasor as affecting former 's ri ght of co ntri bution against cotortfeaso r. 34 A.L.R.3d 137-i .
Release of one respons ible for injury as af·
fecting liability of physicia n or surgeon tor
negligent treatment of injury, 39 A.L.R.3d 260.
Voluntary payment into court of judgment

78-27-43.

agai nst one joint tort feasor as release of others,
40 A.L.R.3d 1181.
Release of one neg ligently treating injury a:;
affecting liability of one origi nall y respons ible
for injury , 64 A.L.R.3d 839.
Validity and elfect of agreement with one
cotortfeasor se tting aside his maXLmum Iiauil ity a nd providmg for reduction or extingui shment thereof relative to recove ry agai nst non·
agreei ng cOlortfeasor, 65 A.L.R.3d 602.

Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, indemnity, contribution.

Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-42 afTects or impairs any common law or statutory immunity from liability. including. but not limited to.
governmental immunity as provided in Title 63 , Chapter 30, and the exclusive remedy provi sions of Title 35 , Chap te r l. Nothing in Sections 78-27-37
through 78-27-42 afTects or impairs any right to indemnity or contribution
arising from statute, contract, or agreement.
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and opportunity to be heard.
This sPoction inferentmll y at lea::;t provides
tha t the commiss ion s hall gi ve noti ce and an
opportunity to be heard to a ll persons whose
ri ghts may be affected by its awa rd. Therefore,
~-.,ro tk e

CO LLAT ERAL

: ;a ture and adequacy (
-";el!ligent injury by en
' k~ upa t io n al disease.
·~t:l tu to ry emp loyer .
_"Sufficient control."
,:-! ubcontractor's employ
Tort liability of emplo
_" Dual capacity" doct
Cited.

RE~-E RE NC E S

G=>

I(ey Numbers. \765.

Comp ulso ry .
Utah Wor kmen's Ca l
pu lsory a nd not eleCll
Foods. 22 Utah 2d 37 :

Workers' Compensation

Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer,
a gent or emolOyee - Occupational disease exc enteri.

The ri ght to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for
inj u ries sus tained by a n employee, whether r esulting in death or not, shall be
the exciusive remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy
" "ainst any odicer. agent or employee of t he employer a nd t he liabil it ies of
cile emp lOye r Imposed by this act sha ll be in place of any and a ll other civil
liabi li ty whatsoever, a t common law or otherwise, to such employee or to his
:-:?ouse. widow, children, parents, dependents. next of kin, heirs. pe rsonal representa ti ves, guardian , or a ny other person whomsoever, on account of any
accide nt or injury or death, in any way contracteu, sustained, aggravated or
incu rred by such e mployee in the course of or because of or arising out of his
employment, and no action at law may be maintained against an employer or
against any officer, age nt or employee of the employer based upon any accide nt. injury or death of an employee. Nothing in this section, however, shall
prevent a n e mployee (or his dependen ts) fro m filing a clai m with the industriai commi::.ision of Utah for compensation in t hose cases within t he provisions of the Utah Occupational Di seatie Disability Act, as amended.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100. ~ 76; C.L. 1917.
! 3132; L. 1921, ch. 67, 1; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943. 42-1-57; L. 1949, ch. 52, ! l.
Cross-References. - Emp loy ment of chi ldren, ~ 34-23-1 et seq.

*
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:~i..J.bil i ty to thir d pan i

com mi ssion. whose award has been a nnu lled.
c~ nnot amend its findin gs of fact s with out giving emp loyer notice a nd a n oppo r tuni ty to be
hea rd. Denver & R.G.W .R.R. v. Indus tri a l
Co mm 'n, 74 Utah 3 16, 279 P. 6 12 (1929) .

100 C.J.S. Workme n's Compensa-

tion § 638.

35-1-60.

-

IN DUSTRIAL CO MMISS ION

c:OTES T O DEC IS IO NS

C.J .S. -

-.:

•

2 ffect of no-fa ult in~
The No-F ault tn~
;$ 3 1..H-l e t. seq., did I
~h c \Vor kmen's Compe
:'~ m e dy provision as a
motor vehicle accident
nl employment . IML r
.138 P.2d 296 (Utah 1

,

E mployer,
Worker was empio
..:o mpa ny, its subsidial
ner to r purposes of th:
.s ions of the Utah \Y ,
Act whe re the cable
oa rt of its manageme!
plo vees together undE
',\'h~ re the worker's t
we re man aged by th
pany. Freund v. Utah
S up·p. 272 (D. Utah

•

Uta h Occupational Disease Disab ili ty Law,
§ 35-2-1 et seq.

Me aning of " this act". - See the note u n·
der the same catchline following § 35-1-46.

NOTES TO DEC ISIONS
ANALYSIS

Co mpulsory.
Effect of no-fa ult insurance.
Emp loye r.
Exclusive ness of remedy.
- Minor engaged in hazardous employment.
Fa rmers a nd domestics.
Hospital cha rges.
Inde mnification agreement het\\ etm emp loyer a nd th ird pa rty.
Inde mnity agree ment.
Intentional tort.
Join t venture.

I
\

\

::xclu s ive n ess of r e
C nder this sect ion \
~ v the negligent act 0 1
n;isconduct bei ng cl:
plovee or, when . the
depe ndents, must be c
pensat ion provided b'
dustrial Comm'n, 7 1
I 1927),
Si nce the en actmen
pe nsati on Act in 191';
a n empl oyee who is ir
employment is the rig
sation provided for in
:-'lurray v. Wasatch C
274 P. 940 (1929 ); (
Wash Laundry , 108
11945 ).
Employee ofrai lro.
tiling claim for com
filed under Federal
on gro und of electi o
have twO remedies b
incurred while he \\
commerce, hi s remec
ployers' Li ability Ac
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~ ;u bllity

has been annulled.
of facts without givn opportu n itv to be
',R.R. v. Industrial
; 9 P. 612 (1929),

ke rs' Compensa t ion

, or offi c er,
disea se ex0; of this title fo r
: or not, shall be
,elusive re medy
he liabil ities of
J all othe r civil
pioyee or to his
s, persona l repaccou n t of any

, aggravated or
:'ising out of his
an employer or
upon any acci howeve r, s hall
vi th t he i nd usthin the provilmended.
,se Disability Law,

- See the note unlowi ng § 35-1-46.

to th ird parties.
:! lure nnd adequacy of act.
<:giigenl injury by emp loyee of same employe r.
>~c llDatlOnai di sease.
;~3 tulOrv

e mployer .

I~

- "Sufficient control. "
' !Ibco ntracto r's employee.
;n rt liability of emp loyer.
-" [) nal C:lpac ilY" doctrine.
,·i ted.

t

:;ompw sory.

s tate act. Utah Idaho Cent. RR v. Industrial
Co mm' n, 84 Utah 364. 35 P. 2d 842, 94 A L.R.
1423 (19341.
This section abrogates employee's commo nlaw right to s ue employer for inj uries suffer ed
~ ffc ct OJ" no- fa u l t in s ura n ce_
while in course of employment. e xcept where
: 'h e ~..,r o -Fault Insurance Act, former
e mployer is not subject to this act or common ·
3 1-41 · 1 et seq .. did not s upersede or nullify
law remedy of employee is expressly rese rved.
_~ H:! Workmen's Compensatio n Act's exclusive
~'lasich v. United States Smeltin£!. Re f. & filin"~ meci v p,ov is ion as applied to injuries from
ing Co., 113 Utah 101. 191 P.2d 612. appeal
;:-:otor venicie accidents sutTered in the course
dismissed, 335 U.S. 866, 69 S. Ct. 138. 93 L.
fi t' e mployment. IML Fre ight, Inc. v. Ottosen,
Ed. 4ll (1948 ).
' 38 P.2d 296 \ Utah 1975).
This sectio n makes it clear that this chapter
S mployer.
is the exclus ive vehicle for recov e ry of co mpensation for injury or death, against the employe r
t.Vorker was employee of cable television
and other e mployees to the exclusion of any
"ompany , ils subsid iary, and its lim iled part·
ner for purposes of the exclusive remedy proviand a ll other civil liability whatsover, at co mmon law or otherwise, and that it bars all next
s ions of t he Utah Workmen 's Compensation
Act where the cable televisio n company, as
uf kin or dependents . or anyon e else, fro m
part or its management style, grouped all e musing a ny other means of recovery against employers and others named in a nd covered by
ployees together under its direct control and
whe re the worker's time sheets and checks . the Act, than the Act itself. !\torrill v. J & M
Co ns tr. Co .. 635 P .2d 88 (utah 1981 1.
we re managed by the cable televi sion compa ny. Freund v. Uta h Power & Light, 625 F.
- Min o r e n gaged in haza r do u s e m ploy>3upp. 272 (D. Utah 1985).
m e n t.
Even if a minor employee is inj ured while
~ xcl u siveness of remedy.
engaged in hazardous e mpl oymem in vi olati on
U nder this section whe n the injury is caused
by the neglige nt act of the e mployer, no willful
of
34-23 -2. prohibiting the e mployment of
minors in hazardou s occupations , the minor's
misconduct be ing claimed, the inju red e mployee or , when the injury causes death, his
exclusive remedy is th rough this chapter. and
dependents, must be content to accept the comthe minor cannot vo id her employment contract and ti ue in tort. Bingham v. Lagoon Corp ..
pensation provided by t he act. Ha lli ng v. In707 P.2d 678 IUtah 1985).
dustria l Comm'n. 71 Uta h 112, 263 P. 78
( 1927).
Farm e r s and do m estics.
Si nce th e enactment of the Workmen 's Co mFarm laborers and domestic s~rvanl s . in the
pensation Act in 19 17 , the e xclus ive remedy of
event of an accident or injury. are entitled to
an e mployee who is inj u red in the cour se of' his
pursue thei r common-law remedies in a n ac employment is t he right to recove r the compention agains t the employer becaul:ie they a re ex satio n provided fo r in the act (9 35-1-1 et seq.).
cepted from the act by §§ 35·1 ·42 and 35-1-43.
Murray v. Wasa tch G rad ing Co .. 73 Utah 43 0.
Mu rray v. Str ike. 76 Utah 118. 287 P . 92:2
274 P. 940 (1929); Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet
( 1930).
Was h Laundry, 108 Uta h 1, 156 P.2d 885
(19451.
H os pital c h a r ges.
Employee of railroad was not precluded from
The on ly power given the Industrial Com fi ling claim fo r compensation by applicat ion
missio n by the worke rs' compensation s tatutes
over hospital cha rges for se rvices rendered to
filed under Federal Em ployers' Liability Act
injured employees is the right to refuse to pay
on g round of e lectio n si nce emplo) ee did not
have two remed ies but only one; if inj ury was
that par t of them which is excessive in a mount
incu rred while he was engaged in interstate
or for care which was not reaso nably necescommerce. his remedy was under Federal E msary; Ind ustr ial Co mm ission does not have the
ploye rs' Liab ility Act and if not. it was under
power and authori ty to se t maximum rates
Utah Workme n's Compensation Act is comml sory and not elective . Lovato v. Beatrice
7 oods , 22 Utah 2d 371, 453 P.2d 692 (1969).

*
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which hospita ls may cha rge for serv ices render ed injured employees, and hospitals are nn t
prohib ited from holding an injured employee
liab le fo r any amounts not paid by the com mi ss ion. Intermounta in Health Care, Inc. v. Indu strial Co mm 'n, 657 P. 2d 1289 (Uta h 19821.

lndemnification agreement between e m·
p loyer and third party.
Where employer a nd third party voluntarily
enter into a written Indemnification agreement whereby the employer agrees to indemnify the thi rd party against claims arising out
of injuries to the employer's employees, and
where a n empioyee is injured and is compensated by the employer in accordance with the
',vorke rs' comnensation law. Lhe exclusive remedy provision' of t his sectio n does not. preclude
t he enfor cement of the indemnification agreement by the thi rd party agai nst t.he employer
fo r amou nts paid by the third party to the em?loyee as a resuit of the injury. Shell Oil Co. v.
'Jrin kerhotf-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187
IUtah 19831.
Indemnity aweement.
"1
'dem nity agreement is a separate unde rt ak mg by the em ployer that will be e nforceIhie d.p:' pit.e workers' compensation if t he in :bmmtv provisio n expressly covers t ho indem:'. ltor 5 '-lmp loyees, but the phrase "pe rson or
Il~ r~c ns ' does not cover indemnitor's ow n em:! if)vee~ given the dramat.ic consequences of
:; u..:!l ..In interpret.ation. Wollam v. Kennecott
Corp .. 663 F. Supp. 268 10. Utah (987).
; n te ntion a i tOrt.
Provision prohibiting action for damaq'es
against fellow emp loyee does not prohibit
maintenance of action for premeditated and intentional act of fellow empluyee. Brya n v. Utah
Int'!, 533 P .2d 892 IUtah (975).
Joint venture.
Construction compa ny obtained contract to
construct diver sion tunnel a t dam and enter ed
into agreeme nt with corporatio n by which the
two organizations would unite the ir efforts to
complete s uch co ns truction a nd s hare in profits
or losses from the e nte rprise. Mine r, hired by
t he const.ruction company, who was injured
while working on the tunnel and who obtained
workmen's compensation benefi ts, could not
sue corporation for alleged neglige nce of co rporate employees since the two companies were
regarded as the employing unit. The employees
of both companies were e ngaged in the same
e mployment. Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 15
Uta h 2d 20, 386 P.2d 616 (19631..
This section ba rred suit by workmen against
joint venture r whi ch was his employer for injuries sustained in use of mach ine furni s hed by a
second joint venturer, whe re machine was furn ished pursuant to contract creatinq' t.he join t

ven ture . Hammer v. Gibbons & Reed Co ..
Utah 2d 415. 510 P.2d ll04 119731.

:Jye r and
··1 not in
:no Browr

~9

~' 72).

LinbiHty to third parties.
Where plaintiff employee was in.iu red when
a fellow emp loyee drove the truck in which
t.hey were ri di ng into the side of a t rain, and
brought an acbion a~ainst the radroad a nd the
man ufacturer of the crossing signai. allegi ng
ne~ligent upkeep and product defect. resoectiveiy, neither defendant coul d join plaintiffs
e mpl oye r as a third-party defendant in order to
assert a claim for con tribution li'om it under
the joi nt tort-feasor statute. Curtis v. Harmon
Elec., [nc., 552 P.2d 117 (Utah 1976): Phillios
v. Union Pac. R.R .. 614 P.2d 153 (Utah 19 '0)
(decided under prior law).

fhis sec t
d ause in
',e subco
:'une cont
~'. bi lity 31
.j~p loyee
:~is ted

ar

tn x sued
'lf decede l
uent's emI
co ntractor
:i provid£
-e el Corr
~t3 6).

Nature a nd adequacy o f act.
The workers' compensation scheme IS purely
statutory, and the act \~ 35-1-1 et sell .' provides a plain, s peedy, and adequate method of
review. Woldberg v. Industrial Comm 'n. 7-1
Utah 309. 279 P. 6U9 119291..

-o rt lia b
- " Oual
::tah la
) the e.
'."o rker·s
··J ual cap
"iove r, sh
:na'y becol
(iitio n to i

Neglige nt injury by e mployee of sa m e e m pl oyer,
Where s ubcontractor was a n "emp loyee" o/"
contractor, other e mployee of contractor could
not maintain negligence action against subcontractOr but must look to workers' compen~ation
insu rance . Gallegos v. Strin gham, 21 Utah 2d
139. 442 P.2d 31 119681..

Brigh a
IUws Cor
·oite 1ml
~ielsen.

Occupationa l disease,
Administratrix of deceased city e mpl oyee,
who died from inha lation of paint. he was ordered to s pray on t rucks, could bring an acuon
a t law a~ainst the employer, s mce !Such was
not a ll accidental injury co mpe ns able under
this act (~ 35-1-1 et seq.), but was an "occupational di sease." Young v. Salt Lake City, 97
Utah 123 , 90 P.2d 174 ( l939).

C.J.S_

;.on S 9 j
A.L.R.
'.\'o rkmen
recover y
e xpense
Worke

S ta tutory e mployer .
- "Suffic ient co ntrol."
Where joi n t owners of inte rests in uil a nd gas
lease~ provideJ for construction of u g-as pro·
cessing plant located in Utah, to be operated as
a "mutually profitable venture" for the purpose
of extracting liquid hydroca rbo ns, and under
the operating agreement the uwners rese rved
the powe r of ultimate control ove r the project
and over the operato r thereof, the ow ners retained "sufficient control" to q ua lify as s tat.utory e mployers of a n employee of the operator
purs uant to § 35- 1-42(:l) and the exclus ive
remedy provis ion of this section appl ied. L:.l.mb
v. \v-Ene rgy, [nc., 663 F. Supp . 395 (0 . Utah
1987).

:35-1-E
Repe .1
-1-2-1-57relating

S ubco ntractor's e mployee.
Subcontractor's employee could not recover
from ge neral contractor in civil action fo r injur ies on theory t hat subcontractor was his em-
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IVORKERS' COMPE NSATION
~ e ed

::l!f.L !!enerai cont,ractor was a third pe rIn lhe sa me employment. Smith v. AIL,:'o wn Co .. 27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P.2d 994

; 1"

Co .. 29

~3) "

j".

J ~ ~t'lio n does not forbid or render invalid
.:1I~t: in a cons truction subcontract by which

:ljured when
..: k in which
,\ train, a nd
-oad and t he
"n!. alleging
:eet. re-s pec.n piaintitfs
Li n orde r to
Jm it under
- v. Ha rmon
7m: Phillips
u ta h (980 )

.. uuCIJ ntractor agreed to indemnify t he
.. ::": contractor and save him harmless fo r all
Ill. ', a n s inl! out of the inju ry or death of nn
·JO ·....:e or ."iubcomractor, where such cla use
. _,' 0 Li no decede nt workman 's administra ': :::.uea prime contractor for wron!--rful deuth
:ieceden t a nd recovered: ther efore, dece.m s emp loyer is reqUIred to reimburse prime
.:LTac tor covered by workmen's compe nsation
ro vi ried in s uch indemni ty clause. Titan
"' -( Co r!). v. Walt.on . 365 F.2d 542 (lOth Ci r.

:51.
ne is purely
·t seq.' pro~ method of
'u mm 'n, 74

~~

I:rn ployee,
he was or.! :I n action
~ tl ch was
Lble under
In "occu pa:e Ci ty, 97

vii and gas
• 1 gas pro" perated as
he purpose
a nd under
-s reserved
the project
owners rey as statuLe operator
exclus ive
lied. La mb
"j m. Uta h

capac ity" doctrine.
law does not recognize as an excep tion
trH! e:~ciu s ive remedy provisio ns of the
·.lr ke r·s i..:ompensati on Act. the so·ca lled
~;;.J.i capac ILY " doctr ine under which a n em·
.0,\'1:1'. Silic ided from tor t liability by t he act.
~ ' a v neeo me liab le in to rt if he occupies, in ad'll u on W il is capaci ty as empioyer, a second ca·
~a n

;' same e mnpJoyee" of
'acto r could
lnst subconmpensaLion
21 Utah 2d

liaoiiity of employer.

,, ·_~ u ~u

,
•
~

I

Brigham Young Law Review. - Utah AlContribution Agai ns t Co·tortfeasor De.~ fllt e ImmunlLv fro m Dis trict Suit: Bishop v.
,-.j ip. isen, 1982 -S .Y.U.L. Rev. 429.
C ..i.S . - i Ol C.J. S. Workmen 's Compensa·
tion ~ 9 18.
A, L,;t_ - Ins ured 's receipt 01 or ri ght to
workmen 's co mpensation beneflls us atTect ing
recovery under accide nt. hospital, or medical
ex pense po licy, 40 A.L.R.3d 1012.
Workers' compensa tion law us precluding

l OWS

j

I

paci ty: thai confers on him an ob ligation inde·
pe ndent of lhose imposed on h im as an em·
player. Worthen v . Kennecott Corp., 780 F.2d
856 £lOth Cir. 19851.
An employee cannot hold his employer liab le
in tort for injuries resultin g from the em·
ployer's maintena nce of unsafe premises, on
the reasonin):! that the employer occupies a separ ate capacity a nd owes sepa rate duties to h is
em ployees as a n owner of the premises, si nce
the employe r's duty to maintain a safe wo rkplace , is inseparable fro m the employer's gen·
er al duties as a n employer towa rd his employees. Bin gham v. Lagoon Corp., 707 P.2d
678 (Utah 1985).
The dual capacity doctrine did not ap ply to a
products liability cia im brought on behalf of a
decede nt who was Kill ed whe n he was puil ed
into a large screw·auger manufactured by de·
fenda nt while decedent was working on hi s employer 's premi ses, where the employer had not
8!;s umed a sepa rate a nd di stinct obli gation to·
wa rd his e mployee othe r tha n as employer.
Stewart v. Cr..ll Co rp .. 740 P.2d 134U (Utah
19871.
Cited in S mith v. Atlan li c Richfield Co. , 8 14
F.2d 148 1 (10th CiL (987).

COLLATERAL RE F ERENCES

I,

i

35-1-61

35-1-01 .

em ployee's s uit aga inst employer for thi rd perso n'S' crimina l a ttack , 49 A.L.R.4th 926.
Wo rkers' compensation act as precluding
tort action for injury to or death of employee's
unborn child , 55 A.L.R.-Hh 792.
Wi ll ful. wanton, or reck less conduct of coem ployee as grou nd of liabil ity despite ba r of
workers' compensation law. 57 A.L.R.4th 88S.
Key Numbers. - Workers' Compe nsa ti on
c=> 2084.

Repealed_

Repeals_ - Section 35-1 -61 (C. 1943, Supp .,
42·1·57·10. enacted by L. 1945. ch . 65, § 2),
relating to injuries to or death of illega lly em·

played minor, was repealed by Laws 1971, eh ,
76. § 11.

·ot r ecove r
·n for inju·
..!s his em·
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Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of p e r·
sons other than employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer - Rights of empioyer or
insurance carrier in cause of action - Maintenance of action - Notice of intention to proceed
against third party - Right to maintain action
not involving employee-employer r elationship Disbursement of proceeds of recovery.
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.,
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. fue l-ion

.' .w d an
': :' ~~ m~n t

u lc .l.1 ext:
C:lpacn

..1 .\1

"cl \lln of re

:pnuo nal in
II\l vent-ure

When a ny injury or death for which compensation is payable under this
utle sh all have been caused by t he wron gful act or neglect of a person other
: han an employer, officer . agen t, or employee of said employer, the injured
·r np loyee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the
" !J ured. empioyee or his heirs or person al repr esentative may also have an
.:c Lion for damages against such third person . If compensation is claimed a nd
,I(: e mployer Of insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation. the
"r nlJ loyer or insurance carrier shall become t rustee of the cause of action
. :~ <li n s t the third party and may brin g and maintain the action either in its
,,·,v n name or in the name of the injured empioyee, or his heirs or the personal
("I 'p rese ntative of t h e deceased, provided t he employer or carrier may not
,·u.. ie a nd release the cau se of actio n without t he co nsent of the commission.
;(!I()re proceeding agai n st the t hird party, the injured employee, or. in case of
fh~ :tl,h , his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to t h e carri er or
· 11. il e r' person obligated for t he compensation payments , in order to give such
:j l ~ r:-;on a reasonable opportunity to enter an ap pearance in the proceedin g.
For t he purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of SecI j f)n ;~!)-1-42 , th e injured employee or his heirs or persona l representative may
; d s(I maintain an actio n for damages agai nst su bcontractors . general contracI fl r s, independent contractors, property owners or thei r ie33ees or H3signs. not
·,!"\:upy ing a n employee-employer relationship with th e lnjul'ed 0 1' deceased
j·r llployee at the time of his injury or death.
If" any recovery is obtained against such t hird person it -,ha ll be di5bursed as
lollows:
(1) The reasonable expense of the actio n, incluci ing at to rneys' fees ,
shall be paid and charged proportionately against the partie, as their
inte rests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to t h e e:::!J loyer or carn er
is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured e",,,ioyee or. in the
case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery hac aga in" the third
party .
(2) The person li a ble fo r compensation payments ,"ail be ,e!mouroed
in full for a ll payments made less th e proporti onat~ ,:,are c·f , 05t5 and
attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection ( ll.
(3) The balance sh a ll be paid to t he injured emp io \'ee or ~-" heirs in
case of death , to be a pplied to reduce or satisfy in ~~ :J a n ,.- :· :'iigation
t hereafter accrui ng against the person liable for cC' :::;,en32:: J :l.

:, i,-,utmden t
'~dn 5!S.

'Il\bu rseme
",:\pens a ll
.'~ t! mpl o ~

, ~ ll' me n ts .
t.l l"u\'a \
"

1,)

In:;u r il r

:"~i! lL o n .

·G · pafty
oj .

·ti OIl a(!ail
.-i aLion

!

.

~ct

t haI. \'

! CU

With

·..'c l" t ha n ~,

recei \" .

. 'I ':

d id

.1 '1 1,

11'

;. v t o pay \
rllO l1alt:: ,,\
'.l,.,t fLUI ( .
:

!

1~7 1 1.

!!l lica b ili l

: :~ is sect!
·r [caSu r s \'.

.. ta tu1.o r ~
': ..• )6:3 ~' .

..... s iq nmen
! :!':tlon

.• I"d

~cr ~on

1lJp Ecant
.. It.("nf:d to

. .·t; .~J ent '
Jm pf: n .~ a u

HlIm n, i :.
'.': here e n
.;1. p! fJ ymen
· .:1 wJ!iQW
. r!

·, ';f) rkn

!OO r

chilli

., .,'. nH; h a l
i~ nrn.; nt I ,

Itis lllry : L. 1917. c h. 100. ~ 72; C .L. 1917.
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Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of persons other than employer, officer, agent. or employee of said employer - Rights of employer or
insurance carrier in cause of action - Maintenance of action - Notice of intention to proceed
against third party - Right to maintain action
n ot involving employee-employer relationship Disbursement of proceeds of recovery.

When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under thi s
ti tle shall have been caused by t he wrongful act or neglect of a person other
than an employer, officer , agent. or employee of said employer. the injured
;'mpioyee , or in case of death his dependents. may claim compensation and the
inju red employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an
~ c tion for damae;es against such third person . If compensation is claimed and
~e empioyer or insurance carrier becomes obli gated to pay compensation. the
-:.mpio,ve r or insurance carrier shall become trustee of t he cause of action
.lgainst the third party and ma y bring and ma intain the action either in its
own name or in the name of th e injured employee. or his heirs or the personal
(2presentative of the deceased . provided t he employer or carrier may not
~ettle a nd release the cause of action without the consent of the commission .
Before proceeding against the t hird party, the injured employee , or, in case of
death. his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to t.he carrier or
other person obligated for t he compensation payments, in order to give such
person a reasonable opportunity to enter a n appeara n ce in the proceeding.
For t he purposes of this section and notwithstanding the prov isions of Sectio n 35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may
a lso maintain an action for damages against subcontractors. ge n eral contra c~
to rs. independent contractors, property owners or t heir lessees or assigns, not
occupying an em pl oyee ~employer relations hip with t he injured or deceased
employee at the time of his injury or death.
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as
follows:
(1) The reasonable expense of t he action, including attorneys' fees,
shall be paid and charged proport ionately against the parties as th ei r
inter ests may appear. Any such fee cha rgeable to the employer or carrier
is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured e mployee or, in the
case of death, by the dependents, for a ny recovery had against t he t hird
party.
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed
in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of costs and
attorneys' fees provided for in S ubsection ( 1).
(3) The ba lance s hall be paid to the injured employee or his he irs in
case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any ob ligation
thereafter a ccruing against the person liable for compensation.
History: L. 1917. c h . IOO. ~ 72: C.L. 1917.
, 3 133; L. 1921. c h. 100. ! I; R.S. 1933.
42.1-58: L. 1939. ch. 51. ~ 1; C. 1943. 42·1·58;

L. 1945. ch. 65, ~ 1: 197 1, ch. 76.
ch. 67. ! 7; 1975, c h. 101, ! 3.
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:'1l1 n~!a m SL lort-feasor prior to compensation award.
iC:.l0 iiity of sectio n.
of ca use of action .

~'-! niTIl:!nt

.,l fU CLl on

of statute.

al'J a ttorney fees.
. ursement of recove ry .
..'o iea l e xpenses.
;Ja i ca pacity" doctrine.
~ . ;ction of remedies.
~ e ntio n al inj ury by fellow employee.
lnt venture.
':«iencndenl heirs.
"·1Oln2'<;.
- _·",,:;l:Jun;ement.
_ . " moensat lon.
'CY'.'J ernrHoy men t.
, ~;{!m ellls.
'?roval 01' commission .
:te imjuram:e fund.
. .;r')Q'2tlOn.
;':l ii~.pa rt )' liability.
j

,i

.;: U.

.\ ctio n aga in s t tort-feasor peior to co mpe n.~ a ti o n a ward .
? ,>.ct t hat workmen 's com pensation cl.:timant
-,mi ~d wit h th ird·party tort· feaso r for sum
-J.rge r tha n any compensatio n award s he could
~ ave recf::ived. before filing compensation
·jai m. uici not relieve compensation insurer of
': uty to pay claimant award renecting ils pro·
,rtlonatc ::oha re of a ttor ney's fees. Grnham v.
.[l(jU Rtnal Comm 'n, 26 Utah 2d 424, 491 P.2d
223 (U)71 1.

claimed from the employer or his insura nce
carrier. Brainard's Cottonwood Oairv v. Industrial Co mm ' n, 80 Utah 159. 14 P.2d 212 , 88
A.L.R. 659 (1935).
It was a conditi on precedent to the e mployee's right to cla im compe nsation from his
employer. where he was inju red by neg ligence
of someone not, his employe r , that he shou ld
assi g-n hi s action fo r dama[{es aga in st the
wrongdoer. Industrial Comm 'n v . Was atch
Grading Co., 80 Uta h 223. 14 P.2d 988 (1932 ).

.-\.ppiicabi lily o i sec tion.
This secti on applies onl y to suits against
tortfeasors who are not em ployers or deemed to
be statutory emp loyers. Lamb v. \v·Ene rgy,
Inc. , 003 F . S upp. 395 (D. Utah 1987>.

Co n s truc tio n o f s t a tute.
This sec tion covers both active a nd pass ive
negligence. Johanso n v. Cudahy Pac king Co ..
107 Utah 114. 152 P.2d 98 (1944 1.
Where s tate insurance fund paid compensa·
tion to injured person. the insur ance carrier
h:1S a cause of ac tion where t,he inj ury was
caused by thi rd perso n: but this does not mean
tha t it had the only cause of action s ince this
section also gives the inju red pe rson a ca use of
action agai ns t the t hird pe rso n . Rog:alski v.
Phi ll ips Petro leum Co .. 3 Utah 2d 203, 282
P.2d 304 (19551.

AssiVlm e nt of cau se o f action .
[f 'action had been commenced against a
third pe rson Lo recover for t he inju r ies or death
of applicant, s uc h action must ti rst have been
assigned to stale insu rance fu nd as a cond itio n
precedent to app licat ion under Workme n's
Compensa ti un Act. Robinson v. Industr ial
Co mm' n, 72 Uta h 203, 269 P. 513 (1928 l.
Where employee was ki lled in course of his
employment by wrongful act of third person ,
and widow chose to claim co mpensat ion under
the Workmen's Compe nsa tion Act. but her
minor ch il d chose to sue u nder former section ,
' n which actio n widow decl ined to join. as asR i gn m ~ nt of ca use of action by widow to e m·
playe r was sutTIcient; a n assignment by the
minor was not necessary. An assignment was
necessary only whe n compen~a t ion was

Co s ts and a tto rney fee s.
State supreme court decisions that permit
reasonable attorney fees to be deducted from
t hat por t,ion of recovery ga ined to rei mburse
sta te insurance fu nd do not apply retroactively
to fees determ ined ' " re lia nce on the fo rme r
ru le. Draper v. T ravelers Ins. Co., ~29 F.2 d 44
(10th Cir. (970); Willia ms v. Uta h Stale Dep't
of Fi n .. 23 Utah 2d ·138. 464 P.2d 596 (19701.
Althoug h insurer was en t itled to reimbu rse-
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:-,~ ~ nt

o( pnyment made to in.JU red ernpif)yee
" no subseuuen dy reco verpd from third oar ty,
<:'4 unuble cf)nsideratinns r eqUIred it to pay its

...:·roportJf)nare s hare or a ttorney 's fe es inCllrrt!d
!.: '/ in jured emp loyee in obtai nin g J ud~m e nt
.,,::unSl t h ird party. Worthen v. Shurti elf &
.\ nll rc w:<) , inc .. 19 Utah 2d 80. 4:~G P .2d 22:1
i )li7l ,

'i tate insu r ance fund iWorken;' Co mpc nsa ·
:: In F\lnd) wm. required to hear it:; oro rata

·na re 01 reasonable attorney fees incurred bv
cla imant in ubtainin g settle ment with th ird
pa rty inasmuch as defendant insurance fu nd
was relieved from burden of payi ng award to
cla imant. Prettyman v. Uta h State Dep't of
;;i n .. 27 Utah :!d 3:13. 496 P .2d R9 (1 972),
;.\"he re nn iniured pp. rso n wno has coll ected
.;nrKmen·s com oensation s ues tilird-na rty tor t:-~ 3so r. both the in jured Derso n and the s ubro:~lI.p.d m surn m:e carner bear Lne ir proport ion.. '"~ ," lIarc 01 costs and attornev fees incurreJ III
,.] t.'lim mz recoverv in tort .' mit. Lam!Uaq-e
": ~ !ea to ::::ubdiv is ion ( 2) bY the 1971 a mend:':Cll! was inte nded to elirni nate uri or unce rt;'lInty nnd make it clear thai:. insu re r shoul d
~·~n r it3 n:"'o]:lOrtion.:ne sha re, a nli insure r candO L avoiJ its s nare or expenseS by iu ring' its
own counse l a nli notifying inj ured pe rson of
lhat fact. La nie r v. Pyne, :l9 Utah ~d 249, 508
P.2d :J8 ( [973).
Disbursement of recovery .

- i''l edical ex pe nses.
Commissi on properly intp.rpreted the phrase
"a ny obl ig'ulion " in Subsection (3 ) to indude
r.lcd ical e xpenses. TJ.yl or v. Ir.rlu stria l
(""Jm m'n. 7~ ~ P.2rl 1183 {Utah 19R71.
" :::) ual cap:l.c ity·' doctrine.
Lilah iaw does not recogn ize as a n e.-..: ception
to the excl us ive re med y provisions Ilf Lhe
Workers' Compensa ti on Act the so-called "d ua l
capacity" doctrine under which an employer ,
shielded from tort liability by t he aCL. may become liable in tort if he occupies. in addition tn
his capacity as e mployer, a second crt pacity
that con fe rs on h im a n obligation inde pendenL
cd" t hose imposed on him as an e mployer ,
Worthen V. Kennecott Corp ., 780 F .2d 856
( (Oth ei r. (9 85).
An e mployee ca nnot held hi s employer li a ble
in to rt for injurips resuitin g from t he e mployer's mai nte nance of u nsafe pre mises, on
Ihe reason ing that the empl oye r occupIes a sepa ra te ca pacity and owes sepa rate duties to h is
employees as a n ow ner of the premises, !'I ince
the emp loyer's duty to mainta in a safe work
place is inseparabl e f}"nm the emp loye r's ge n..-ral duties as a n e mpl oye r towa rd his e mployees, Bin gham V. Lagoon Co rp. , 707 P .2d
678 ilhah (985 ).
Electi o n of r e m edies,
\vh~ r e city pn liceman was Iniured by third

'Ill e del ivering a II

pe rsoll. :.m d city paid policeman compensatIOn
in fl'l r m of w:tl{es. act ion by po liceman aga in st
th ird person which wa s dis mi ssed wi tho ut prejud ice, comme nced prior to ass ignme nt of cause
of actio n to city, was not an election so as to ba r
police ma n's s ubsequent clai m for compe nsalio n from city. Sa lt Lake City V. Ind ustrial
Co mm 'n,lH Utah 213, . 17 P .2d 239 0982l.
Employee of rai lroad was not precluded from
filin!t claim for compensation by appli cation
filed und er r'eder a l Employers ' Liabili ty Act
on grou nd of election since emplovee did not
have t wo remedies but only one; if inj ury was
incurred while he was engaged in interstate
commerce his remedy was u nder Fede ral Employer s' Liability Act: if not. it was under state
act. Utah Idaho Ce nt. R.R. V. Industrtal
Co mm 'n. 84 Utah 364. :1 5 P .2d 842 , 94 A.L.R.
[4"3 ( 193~) .
in a case in which fireman was killed by colla pse of a ladder wh ile in the performance of
his duty, his depe ndents could exercise thei r
rig-h l to elect under terms of this section to pu r;-. I te tneir re medy against third-pu rty wronl!doer. Ham ilton v. Co mmission of Fin .. lOS
Utah 5 7·~ . Hi2 P.2d 758 0945).
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~:~' uble recovery by t
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Intentional injury by fellow emp loyee.
One who is injured by the intentional act of a
fellow e mployee may seek recovery for dam:3ges as Drovided fo r in this section. Bryan v ,
Uta h Int'\' 533 P .2d 892 (Utah 1975).
Joint venture,
Construction co mpany obtained contract to
co nstruct divers ion t unnel at dam a nd e ntel'ed
into agreement with corporat ion by which t he
~ wo t'l r gan iZ3Li on:; would unite the ir efforts lO
co mpietl! such construction a nd share in proliLs
" r losses I"rom the en terprise. Mine r , hired by
t he cons tru ct ion compa ny , who was inj ured
while worki ng on the tunnei, and who obta in ed
workme n's compen sation be nefits. could not
sue corporation for a lleged neglige nce of corporate employees s ince t he two compa nies were
rega rded as the e mploying unit. T he e mployees
of uoth co mpan ies were en gaged in the same
employment. Coo k v, Peter Kie wit So ns Co., 15
Uta h 2d 20, 386 P.2d 616 (1963 1.
No nd ependent heirs.
Legislature did not intend to dives t the ri g- hI.
of he irs to damages under the wrongfu l death
statute if they a re nonde pendents a nd received
no compe nsat ion benefits . Ol iveras V . Ca ribouFour Co rners, Inc .. 598 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1979).
Plead ings.
Co mpl ai nt by assignee should a ll ege paymen t. of th e a ward . Johan son V. Cudahy Pack·
i n~ Co., 101 Utah 219. 120 P.2d 28 1 094 11.
Compl ai nt was sufficie nt to state a cause of
action for negligence in act ion by depende nts of
a tru ck driver who was kill ed whe n he backed
a truck into some hi gh tension electric wires
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so n v. Fowler. 27 Uta h 2d 159. 49:1 P.2d 997
(l972 l.
Emp loyee of electrical s ubco ntractor was "in
the sa me employment" as general contracto r
and not entitled to mai nta in actIOn under this
sectIO n where general cuntra:.:tor maintained
ri gnt to s upervi s ion or con trol over subcontractor by s upervising over all co ntinuity and inteh'Tation of work among various su bcontractors,
directi ng the seque nce of work by the subcon·
t ractors. making changes In the work done by
the m a nd ordering work stoppa~es; decedent's
only remed y was under Workme n's Compensa·
tion Act. Adamson v. Okland Constr. Co., 29
Utah 2d 286, 508 P.2d 805 (1973l.
Where decedent employee of gene ral co ntracto r was electrocuted. allegedl y throu~h negligence of subco ntractor , lf1 accident occu rr ing
prior to 1975 amendment of this sec tion. subcontractor was in sa me emp loyme nt as dece·
dent under ~ 35· 1·42. a nd hei rs we re pre·
ciudcd from maintllining wron~ul death acii on a ga inst it by provi s ions of § 15·1·60.
Shupe v. Wasatch Elec. Co .. 546 P.2d 896
(utah 1976l.
Where plaintiffs decedent and a nothe r were
fdlow emp loyees at time of accident, thi s section prohibi ted a~ ti on oy plai nt.iff agai nst the
fe ll ow e mployee a nd si milarly prohibited the
defenda nt from joining the fell ow emp loyee as
a joint tort·feasor fo r purposes of contribution .
Phillips v. Union Pac. R.R., 614 P.2d 153 1Utah

i.1 load of sal t to defe nd ant
co moany. which salt defendant had or·
" ,) nJ ueceased's e mployer. J oha nso n v.
~U": t":lC kin~ Co., 107 Utah 114. 152 P .2d

.' !·I l.

:m uu r scment.

'.:1:"
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\ll ~ ura nce

fund (Workers' Compensa·
enti tl ed to he re imbursed not on ly
···!1:1l. /lW; been paid to the injured employee
• R t!me 0\ the trial. but also lor any acid i·
;1;11 sum that it was leg-ally obligated to pay.
' '.l:i lrlai Co mm 'n v. Wasatch Grading Co. , 80
.' !1 :::!2:J. 14 P .2d 988 (1932).
iured employee's settle me nt and release
!"\ !1is orivate ins urance carrie r . under unin:':r:. motorist coverage. did not affect cla im of
,~ In ,;ura nce fund (Workers' Compensation
:10' a !! ~l1nst thi rd·party tort-feasor and in"" 1] emoJOyee wa s not required to reimburRe
:-_: \ f0 f wOrKme n's ~o m pensaLio n De nefit ~ paid
: .lIn. ;::(!utheast Furn. Co . v. Ba rrett. 24
.rl ~ J :'!-!-. 465 P.2d 346 (19701 .
.: rcl. Da rlV was nOL t! n litled to have amount
~:I.:h: m c nt awarded injured employee reduced
~ rn r) unL or workmen 's compensa ti on bcnelits
,~~ Ia d) ~ m Dio yee; third party's ~unte n tio n s
.~U L emplOyer a160 was negligent. that insur.,1 ~e com pany stood in shoes of employe r and
'J ll seauentiv that insu r er should not recove r
. !"!1ou~t of compensatlo n paid injured e mployee
· H~ci.~d. Texaco, Inc. v. P r uitt, 396 F.2d 237
. Uth C lf. 1968).
T he purpose of the right of reimbursement
",; tabli;;hed oy this section is only to prevent
:Huhle recovery by the emp loyee or his o r her
·!:lenden::; . •d b tate Ins. Co. v. Bliss. 725 P.2d
~ :..:~ O (lilah 1986 ).
" " IIntill S

1980).

Se ttleme nts .

- Co mpe n satio n .
"Compensation". within the meaning of t.his
sect ion . is limited to a mounts claimed by the
empl oyee or the dependents. Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Bliss, 725 P.2d 1330 (Utah 1986).
The
fixcd
payme nt
made
under
~ 35· i- fi8(2 )( aJ. when it is determined that a
deceased employee had no dependents. is not
"compe nsa ti on" withi n the meanin g of thi s sec·
tio n, and where the decede nt's parents s ued t he
to rt· feaso r and its insurer. the insu rance fund
co u ld neithp. r invade the pa re nts' recovery no r
pursue a separate clai m ngain!'.t the ins urer in
order to recover the amou nt paid into the Sec·
ond Injury Fund. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Bli ss, 725
P.2d 1330 (Utah 1986).
Sa me e mploy m e nt.
Ne ither subcontractor placing t imbers in
dome of large build ing no r materialmen s upplyi n ~ scaffolding for use in construction was
en1.!a~ed "i n the sa me e mployment"' as em·
IJiflyee of general constr uction co ntractor fo r
!)uild ing within meaning of this .<:ecl ion. Peter-

-Approval of co mm ission.
This section does not requi re thllt the commi ss ion app ro\'e E'mployee·i mtiated settle·
ments. The commiSSion is required to approve
employer ·init iated se ttieme nts in orde r to protect the interest of t.he e mployee a nd prevent
the employer from entering into a settleme nt
that places the employer's welfare abo\'e that
of the employee. Th at concern is not present
when it is t.he employee who settles the s uit.
Tador v. lndustria l Comm 'n. ; ·13 r .2d 1183
(Utah 19871.

Sta te insurance fund.
State insurance fund (Workers' Compe nsa·
tion Fund) had no right to recover fo r compen·
sation benefits paid out of th at part of a wrongfu l death recovery d ue to heirs who had received no workme n's compensation benelits.
Oliveras v. Car ibo u· Four Corners. I n~ .. 598
P.2d 1320 (Utah 1979\.

S uhrogatio n .
Where employee's ori gina l injury was aggra·
vated by physician's mal practice, insu rance
~a rri e r was s ubrogated to employee's action
against the physicia n: but if a greater amou nt
was recovered than that pa id emp loyee in com·
pensat ion. the employee was en ti tled to it.
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!1 J.ker v. Wycoff. 95 Utah 199, 79 P.2d 77
,l 9381.

E mployee of a masonry subcontracto r whose
work was subiect to the con~ru! of the general
contractor was an employee of g'enerai contract.or fo r purposes of this section and was not entitled to recover in tort 8£!"ai nst the ,l reneral
contractor. Sm ith v. Alfred Brown Co .. 27 Utah
2d 155. 493 P.2d 994 11972l.

T hird-party liability.
Fact that defendant owned ore stockpi le did
cot mc.ke defrmdant a possessor of the land and
I her eby 1iahl e as third party under this sectio n
fo r d-2ath of contractor's I;'!mployee caused by
'lnsafe condition of stockpi le. Stevens v. Colof:ld o Fuel & Iron. 24 Vtuh 2d 214. 469 P.2d 3
, 1970),

Cited in Smith' v. Atlantic Richtield Co .. 814
F .2d 1481 ( 10th Cir. 1987).

History: L. 1
3 136; L. 1919

C.J .S. - 99
lion ~ 296.

35-1-65.
CO LLATERAL REFERENCES
Right to maintain malpractice suit against
!njured employee's attending phYRician not·
with standing receipt or" workmen 's compensation award. 28 A.L.R.3d 1066.
Key Numbers. - Wo rkers' Compensation

C.J.S. - 101 C.J.S. Workmen's Co mpensa·
tion
983 et seq.
.\.L.R. - Uninsured motorist coverage: vali dity and etfect of policy provi sion purportinqto reduce cove ra'{e by amount paid unde r
',':orkm e n's compensation law. 24 A . L.R.~~d

*

<::=> ~158.

1369 .

::5-1-63.

Judgments in favor of commission -

Preference.

:\ll judgments obtained in any actio n prosecuted by the commission or by
the state under the authority of this title shall have the same preference
against t he assets of the employer as claims for taxes,
History: L. 1917. ch . 100,

~

74; C.L. 1917,

§ 3135; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42- 1·59.

NOTES TO DECISIO NS
si on lor insu rance premium is not t'ntitled to
be paid out or" proceeds of sale of mortgaged
real estate ahead of prior mortgagee . Local Realty Co. v. Steele. 90 Utah 468 , 62 P.2d 558
( 1936).

of preierence.
;udgmem meeting requirements of this section is only given a preference equal to the
preference of tax claims in distribut ion of assets and is not given same status as a tax lien:
accordingly. jud~ment of Industrial Commis~·::cte nt

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. - 100 C.J .S. Workmen's Compensation § 638.

35-1-64.

9

Key Numbers. 1765.

Workers' Compensation

Compensation - None for first three days after
injury unless disability extended.

No compensation shall be allowed for the first three days after the injury is
received, except the disbursements h ereinafter authorized for medical. nurse
and hospital services, and for medicines and funera l expenses, provided, however, if the period of total temporary disability lasts more tha n fourteen days,
compensation shall also be payable for the first three days after the injury is
received.
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History: L.
, 3 137; L. 191
11.5. 1933,42c h.51. ~ 1;C
~

1; 1949. ch.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

·. L COMMISSIO N

l id period does not r emedy such devided in this section and the court is
nd a tempora ry injunction restrain'er's business.

'5-1-59.
.;

,

i

uses

t6. relating to payme nts out of t he Worke rs'
,mpe nsation Fund. effective April 23, 1990.

Exclusive remedy against employer, or DIncer,
agent or empioyee - OccuDational disease excepted.
ANALYS IS

~ xclus iv e ne::;s of remedy.
,"cder al law.
.ndemn ification agreement between employer
and lhi rd party.
:n tentionai tort.
:!tatutory employer.

Pre-e mption by Longshore a nd Harbor
orke rs' Compensation Act (33
§§ 901
s,eq.i of s tate law claims for bad-faith dealing
, Insu rer or agent of insurer, 90 A. L.R. Fed.
'3.

FERENCES

would have Lo seek satisfacllon of the employer's obligation thr ougn proceeciine;s In tne
distri ct. court under this sec tlon . l'homas A .
Paulsen Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. 770 P.2d
125 (Utah [989>.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

.FERENCES

for violation - Notice of
:lOf required - Admissible
prosecution.

j n insured Employers' Fund.
Commission's order fi nding ~ n uninsured
.:mployer liable for benefits paid to a n injured
"tnployee by the Uninsured Emp loye rs' Fund
"/8S alfirmed with the direction that the fun d

' 0.3-1-60.

CISIONS
sura nee a~en t absco nded with the e mployer 's
em ium a nd fa il ed to arrange for a policy.
lomas A. Paulsen Co. v. Indus trial Camm'n
o P.2d 125 (Utah 1989),
'

E nforcin15

NOTES TO DECISIONS

~e nt.

effectiv e Aoril 24. 1989, substituted "30
.lys" fo r "90 days" I n Subsections (1)(a). (b).
l d (e); substi t uted "c hapter" for "act" in the
:st se ntence of Subsection (2); designa ted the
rmer second pa r agrapn in Su bsection (2) as
lhsection (3); and made minor s tylistic
langes.

Docketing awards in district court
judgment.

35-1-60

I

Zxclusive n ess of remedy.
Former cou nt.y employee's claims against the
"ounty or agai nst individual co-e mployees
Alsed on negligent infliction of e motional dis·
;'uss or otherwise based u pon neglige nce we re
,'3 rred by Lhe excl usive re medy provision of
tilis sectio n. Sa uers v. Salt Lake County, 735
'-. Supp. 38 1 !D. Utah 1 9~0).
r'edera1 law,
Feder a l government em ployee was barred
from bringi ng negligence suit. agai nst a fe llow
employee where, unde r fede ra l la w, the e m·
?ioyee's excl usive remedy was agai nst the
iJ nited States and she ha d li led for and re·
ce ived benefits from t he Uni ted States govern·
ment. Hope v. Berrett, 756 P .2d 102 (U tah Ct.
App. 1988).
Indemnification agreeme nt b e twee n e m·
p loyer and third party.
The exclus ive remedy provis ion of this sec·
tion ba rs a claim by a third party that a statu·
tory empl oyer impliedly agreed to indemnify
t he t hird pa rt.y aga inst claims for inj uries s us ·
tained by a n e mp loyee. Freund v. Utah Power
& Light Co., 793 P .2d 362 (Utah 1990).
Intentional tort.
An e mployee who, in t he course and scope of
h is or her e mployment, intentionally act s to
inj ure a co-worker is not protected by the ex·
d usivity provis ion fro m a se parate action at
law fo r damages. But, in such a case. the em·
player is li ab le only to t he extent or wor kers'
compensatio n benefits unl ess the injurious act
was di rected or inte nded by the em ploye r . 795

P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). cert . gra nted.
Mou nteer v. Uta h Power & Light Co .. 7i3 P.2d
4U5 (Utah Ct . App. 19891.
Requiring un injur ed emp loyee to show that
his e mploye r or fellow employee manifested a
deliber ate intent. t.o injure him before ai lowin e
a n exception to the statut.e for a n tntention al
tort is fully consistent wit.h the purpo;;e of the
workers' compensat.ion act. Knowl edge to a
substantial certainty that inj ury will follow is
not su tTIcient to invoke t he exceptio n. Lantz \' .
Nationa l Semiconductor Corp., 775 P.2d 93 i
(Utah Ct. App . 19891.

S tatutory employer .
The legislature has, in clear and unmistakable lan guage, evinced an intention to allow
suits by an injured worker against those per·
sons who might be h is or her statUlory .am·
ployers as defined in § 35·1 ·42. The immedi ·
ate. or common-law. employer , who actually
pays compensa ti on. and it s ot1i!;crs. agents.
and employees are shielded by the exclusive
re medy immunity conferred by this sec t ion.
Pa te v. Marathon Steel Co., 777 P.2d 428
(Utah 1989).
The dec ision in Pate v. Marathon Steel Co ..
777 P.2d 428 (Utah 19891. holding that the
state Wo rkers' Compen sation Act should no
longe r be construed to pr ovide tort im munity
to statutory employer s who have not been reo
quired to pay benefits t here under to the in ·
jur ed worker, shou ld be given retroactive effect. Lamb v. \v·Energy, Inc. , 884 F.2d 13 .. 9
(lOth Ci r . 19891 (reversing Lamb v. \v-Energy ,
Inc., 663 F. Supp. 395 (D. Utah 198i1. wh ich
a ppears under this catch line in bound volume !.
A worker can sue a statutory e mp loyer who
has not been required to pay wo rkers' co mpensation benefits. and the latter IS no t protected
by the immun it.y a1Tor ded by this secu on.
Bosch v. Busch Development, Inc .. tii P .2d
431 (Utah 1989).
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35-1-62

LABO R -

IN DUST RIAL COMM ISS ION

COLLATERAL REFE RENCES

.\.L.R . - "Dual ca pacity doctrine" as bas is
fo r e mployee's r ecove ry fo r medica l mal pr actice from compa ny med ical pe rsonnel. 73
A. L.R.4th 11 5.
Wor kers' compen sation : t hird-pa rty tort lia-

35-1-62.

'.- ~ -35. Ten
Sta

hili ty of cor par a te officer to inj ured worker s . 76
A. L.R.4th 365.
Workers' compensation statu te as ba rring illegally emp loyed minor's tort action , 77
A. L.R.4th 844.

A,
~ci ass ili c a t i o n of d.

Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of persons other than employer, officer, agent, or employee of said emp loyer - Rights of employe r or
insurance carrie r in cause of action - M ainten ance of action - Notice of intention to procee d
a gainst third party - Right to maintain action
~ot involving employee-employe r relationship Disbursement ot proceeds of recovery.

:1oilization of cono
::c iussifica tion of
~c cord wi th ser
·,.. lume. See Rekwal
'0 P. 2d 166 (Utah
':hen a claimant 1
~o n. he is no longe r e
. its a nd h is status m
":.ltlon is a factual qUi
..~~ all.:ai evidence c·
,J riflith v. Industria
_·t~l h Ct. App. 198t
Te mpor ary disabi i
.isconti nued as soor
,t abiliza t ion is reach
. h e d aimant is actu a

NOTES TO DECISIONS

S tatutory e mployers.
The legislature has. in clear a nd u nmista ka ble la nguage , evi nced a n in te nti on to allow
su its by a n injured wo r ker agains t t hose perso ns who m igh t be his or her statutory em·
ployers as defi ned in § 35-1-42. The immedia te . or common-law , e mployer , who actually
pays com pe nsa tion, a nd its officers, agen ts.
a nd em ployees a re s hiel ded by the excl us ive
remedy immuni Ly conferred by § 35· 1·60. Pa te
v. Marathon Steel Co. , 777 P.2d 428 (Utah
1969).
The decis ion in Pa te v. Ma ra t hon Steel Co.,
777 P .2d 428 (Utah 1989), holdi ng tha t t he
s tate Wor kers' Compensation Act should no

longer be construed to pr ovide tort im muni ty
to s tatutory e mploye rs who have not been requ ired to pay be nefi ts thereunde r to t he inj ured worker , should be give n retroactive ef·
fect. Lamb v. W-Ene rgy. Inc. , 884 F .2d 1349
(l Ot h Ci r. 1989 ) (reve rsin g Lam b v. \v· Energy ,
Inc., 663 F. Supp. 395 to. Utah 1987). whi ch
appea rs unde r " Applicabili ty of section" catc hli ne in bou nd. volume ).
A wor ker can s ue a s ta tutory e mployer who
has not bee n requ ir ed to pa y wor ker s' compe nsation benefit s. a nd t he la tter is not protected
by the immunity afforded by § 35· 1-60. Bosch
v. Busch De velopme nt . Inc., 777 P .2d 43 1
(Uta h 19691.

CO LLATERA L REFERENC ES

A.L.R. - Prej udi cial effect of bri ngi ng to
j ury's a tte nti on fa ct that plain tiff in pe rsona l
inj ury or death action is entitled to worker s'
compensation benefi ts. 69 A.L.R.4 t h 13 1.
Worke rs' com pensa ti on: th ird-pa rty tort liability of corporate officer to injured worke rs, 76
A.L.RAth 365.

Wor kers' compe nsation : compe nsabil ity of
inj uries incurred t rave li ng to or from medica l
treat me nt of ea rlier compe nsable inj ury , 83
A.L.R. 4th 110.

•
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Tab B

APPENDIX B

~y

~couler

~~~t--

Do you have any facts

you've already told us that you were

SC8:Jler.
ga~lcn

and Union Pacific Railroad.

~ave

00 you

any facts that

e~plcyed

subs~ant~ate

by

~~e

alle-

made by your attorneys that you were eop:oyed by Union

Pacific Railroad?

3

h.

,

No,

Q.

Paragraph 8 of the complaint, your attcrneys allege

that your accident was caused by Scouler and Union Pacific's
What facts are you aware of which would support

~ealigence.
~J

tha~

allegation?
~\.

_0.J

17

I

I don't know about Union Paci:ic,

I've said before

abou~

the lighting.

think that was it.

Q.
:5

don't.

I

a~y

I

t~e

way of kicking

And you excluded Union Pacific,

bu-: Seculer, ',..'hat

~he

~rains,

you

dcn/~

possibly

~~ow

of

way that--

,
......

I

Q.

You indicated to Mr. Williams that you were

don't kncw.

,;0,

I

don't.

18

receiving workman's cCDpensation benefits as a result of this

19

accident.

That's correct?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

00 you still receive those?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

How much do you receive?

•

A.

$230

I

Q.

How long have you been receivi:--.g those paj'::',ents?

I
•

a ·,;eek.

185
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I
.

~

1

~

1

.

Q.
poin~

!

3

j
2S
~2

19

J

Do you understand that they will be

You just don't know when?

A.

I'm not sure when.

Q.

Do you know ',;hat your expenses, r:1edical expenses are

a result of this accident?
No.
Paragraph 6 of your complaint, your attorneys allege
expenses in excess of $300,000.

:'nformation to in any

·~.iay

~o

~·ou

ha~.re

support or substantiate

any

,::-~a~

clai::1

$JOO,OOO?

A.

I

don't know.

Q.

~ould

jus~

have to checK the

~edical

~ecor=s.

I don't know how much.

You are receiving those workman's

benefits through your employer,

21

correct?

..

SCI:'.e

Q.

20

22

at

C'clt

Yes.

i

'-'.I..

18

::: don't.

A.

~edical

17

No,

In time?

Q.

IS

accident .

con~inue?

1
~

t~e

Do you kncw how many more ',;eeks those paj'T.',ents ',;il::'

~

.'\

6

since

..

I

,

C!

.

co~pe~sa~lcn

Scouler Grain Company,

A.

I think it's--Ranger Insurance is who's dOlng it.

Q.

Right.

I represent to you that they are the insurer

for Scouler Grain.
25

A.

Okay, yes.
~86

I
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,

-

·,,'ork"'7:an
..
I
......

JJ

"

JI

.

3ut it is Ranger insurance that

Q.
S

.

-

p~8v~jing

~~e

you

co;npensation benef its?

Yes .

Q.

You actually get a check that says Rangec Insurance?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Well,

~hat

I'd like you to do

everything you can remember,
3

~s

from the

~s

ti~e

there after the train stopped until the

take
yeu

ti~e

~e

~~rDugh

~ere

laying

you gct to the

hosnital.
A.

J

I just

re~ember

an 2nbulance, and

ge~

that Wassim found

~~en

tunch of other people,

just before

they took me out of there.
~ith

~lew

Then the

_

a~bulance

to

ar~~ved

~~~nk,

~

ra~

arrived and

And then--but then they had to fly

the helicopter once they got me to the hospital, they

00 you renencer naking any stateDents tc anyone

18

about how the accident occurred during that

19

you just described?

20

A.

I don't remeDber ',.;hat I said.

21

Q.

Do you

A.

I

re~ernber

rerne~~er

h~~

talking at all to

tl~e

perlod that

Wassi~?

being there, but I don't

rerne~~er

,-

I said anythlng to him.
Q.

25

a~bula~ce

r3~

me to another hospital.
Q.

23

~e

and

other Seculer employees,

up to see if they cculd help.

~e

t~e

~e

We directed some interrogatories, questions tc you,

and I assume you helped answer those.

Do you remember a
137
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APPENDIX C

Letter from Ranger Insurance Company

December

l~

r)

Christensen, Jensen and Powell
~10 Clark Learning Building
1~5 S'"
Tenple
531-:. L~%e City, CT U"-t-'-U.1
n

L.

:< 2 :

Rich

C ~ a i rn LJ 0.:

~

1

~

i-- ,

i-~ur:tp~'1crys

8 8 2 .~ 1

Style:
Sullivan vs Scoular, et al
10-i/-or)
Date of Accldent:
Dear Hr. HUl.lpherys:

rhiec file cane through on routine diary, and
been appeased of
de'/elop~nents
not
~:;cpter:'.ber of 1'139.

1-:'~1ve

Please provide us w1th a short status report cove r i ~1g
tor
t::: i -':i:
iJ.:~j/
p::-ese:ltly
set
this
case
1S
developments.
rlO-:'

The
E\2ngerInsurance
Cc;:'.t=·J.!1Y
is
still
~H:"c·.r~_:~:lJ
,,~:::~·:-:;~s'
compensation benefits to l·jr. Sullivan and i1~ve paid up~roxi~(ltely
$215,201 in medical ~it~l $GO,3G9 i:1 weekly injc~~it~· p~l~·~~~t~.
Should
ple~lse

you need
ad\'ise.

We are looking

anj·thl;-'lg

for~ard

:rc~

cur

;·.'or~:ers

to this S!1crt status

I

~e~crt.

Yours tr'...ll::·,

. ~c '-"+v-.
(
- .'
John B.
CICliT:1s
~I3G/rd

Cc:---.;:er'.sClt:C~-:

l:

i=-2,

